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| Dès lors que l'on ne reconnaît pas les principes de base de la logique en s'exprimant, alors ce qu'on dit n'a pas plus de valeur que son contraire absolu. Ainsi, cela équivaut à « faire du bruit avec la bouche » et non à communiquer une idée. | | Dès lors que l'on ne reconnaît pas les principes de base de la logique en s'exprimant, alors ce qu'on dit n'a pas plus de valeur que son contraire absolu. Ainsi, cela équivaut à « faire du bruit avec la bouche » et non à communiquer une idée. |
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| https://mises.org/library/economics-and-ethics-private-property-0
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| http://propertyandfreedom.org/2016/10/hans-hermann-hoppe-on-the-ethics-of-argumentation-pfs-2016/
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| In a nutshell – I shall come to more detailed explanations and clarifications shortly – the argument runs like this:
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| That: All truth-claims – all claims that a given proposition is true, false, indeterminate or un-decidable or that an argument is valid and complete or not – are raised, justified and decided upon in the course of an argumentation.
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| That: The truth of this proposition cannot be disputed without falling into contradiction, as any attempt to do so would itself have to come in the form of an argument. Hence, the“Apriori” of argumentation.
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| That: Argumentation is not free-floating sounds but a human action, i.e., a purposeful human activity employing physical means – a person’s body and various external things – in order to reach a specific end or goal: the attainment of agreement concerning the truth-value of a given proposition or argument.
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| That: While motivated by some initial disagreement, dispute or conflict concerning the validity of some truth-claim, every argumentation between a proponent and an opponent is itself a conflict-free – mutually agreed on, peaceful – form of interaction aimed at resolving the initial disagreement and reaching some mutually agreed-on answer as to the truth-value of a given proposition or argument.
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| That: The truth or validity of the norms or rules of action that make argumentation between a proponent and an opponent at all possible – the praxeological presuppositions of argumentation – cannot be argumentatively disputed without falling into a pragmatic or performative contradiction.
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| That: The praxeological presuppositions of argumentation, then, i.e., what makes argumentation as a specific form of truth-seeking activity possible, are twofold: a) each person must be entitled to exclusive control or ownership of his physical body (the very mean that he and only he can control directly, at will) so as to be able to act independently of one another and come to a conclusion on his own, i.e., autonomously; and b), for the same reason of mutually independent standing and autonomy, both proponent and opponent must be entitled to their respective prior possessions, i.e., the exclusive control of all other, external means of action appropriated indirectly by them prior to and independent of one another and prior to the on-set of their argumentation.
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| And that: Any argument to the contrary: that either the proponent or the opponent is notentitled to the exclusive ownership of his body and all prior possessions cannot be defended without falling into a pragmatic or performative contradiction. For by engaging in argumentation, both proponent and opponent demonstrate that they seek a peaceful, conflict-free resolution to whatever disagreement gave rise to their arguments. Yet to deny one person the right to self-ownership and prior possessions is to deny his autonomy and his autonomous standing in a trial of arguments. It affirms instead dependency and conflict, i.e.,heteronomy, rather than conflict-free and autonomously reached agreement and is thus contrary to the very purpose of argumentation.
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| == Voir aussi == | | == Voir aussi == |
